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Critical Evaluation for Education Reform
Gisele A. Waters
Auburn University
Abstract
        The school reform movement has done little to provide an accurate analysis of the
production of inequality or the reproduction of social injustice in the public schools or
the larger social order. The ideology that influences this movement has often prevented
the realization of any notion of an egalitarian ideal, the elimination of inequality, or the
improvement of those who are least well-off. I ask educators and evaluators of education
reform efforts to reconsider critically their roles in social science research, to reclaim the
battleground of public school reform by focusing on the democratic purpose of public
schooling, and the institutional problems in educational programs and practice that often
inhibit action toward this ideal. The first part of this article includes an extensive
argument explaining the "why" of critical evaluation. The theoretical literature on
inquiry in science and social science, the ideology of critical theory, critical social
psychology, and Freirean pedagogy are consulted as additional tools for augmenting the
practice, policies, and responsibilities of evaluators in education. I review three
contemporary perspectives of evaluation in order to begin rethinking the purposes and
functions that evaluation serves in education. It also demonstrates how mainstream and
contemporary evaluations can be used to serve a particular set of social and political
values. The second part of this article begins a preliminary journey toward describing the
"how" of critical evaluation. Critical evaluators can fight for social justice by combining
the merit criteria of state and federal public education law, and the methods of an
adversary oriented evaluation in order to transform educational environments that serve
the future potentials of all children. Therefore education involves the practice of
freedom, the means by which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality
and discover how to participate in the transformation of their world (Freire, 1985).
The Argument for Critical Evaluation of Education Reform
Part I: The "Why" of Critical Evaluation
          Schools are inextricably linked to the communities they serve through social,
political, economic, and cultural interests. To better comprehend public education, the
socio-cultural, political, and hierarchical relationships that transpire within the school as
well as within the community must be linked to the broader political and economic
issues of society at large (Ogbu, & Matute-Bianchi, in press). To begin to realize the
possibility for reforming public education, and to begin fighting for social justice in
education, especially for those children who are disadvantaged, we must first re-examine
the historical nature of the problems of education and the communities in which these
schools exist (Noll, 1997).
Education Reform
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The Conceptualization of Educational Evaluation as Practical
Educational Research
          Many attempts have been made in recent years to clarify the meaning of
evaluation and expose the distinction between evaluation and other related concepts
such as measurement or research. The literature contains many approaches regarding the
conceptualization of evaluation and the determination of its countenance in education
(Nevo, 1986). According to Nevo (1986), many of these approaches have been unduly
referred to as "models" (for example, the CIPP Model, the Discrepancy Model, the
Responsive Model, or the Goal-Free Model) in spite of the fact that none of them
includes a sufficient degree of complexity and completeness that might be suggested by
the term "model." For the benefit of those of us who lost their way among the various
models and approaches, I simply suggest taking a holistic approach to considering
educational evaluation as an extended arm of practical educational research. 
          Education is a field like medicine in that its name simultaneously refers to a
practice and to a field of disciplinary inquiry (Scriven, 1986). Scriven stated that the
paradigm of research in the area of the philosophy of education, to take one example, is
surely the paradigm of philosophical research in any area. But that leaves open the area
of research that we normally think of as the domain of scientific research in medicine or
education. Traditionally, we have tended to suppose that in this area of medical or
educational research the correct model is that of the related sciences. That is, for
example, educational research has modeled itself on social science research. Similarly
educational evaluation has modeled itself as an offspring of educational research. In
medical research that approach has brought some problems because it seems to lead to
results that conflict with the practical wisdom of physicians and the economic realities of
the patients. The same can be seen in education with the refined development of IQ tests,
norm- referenced testing, and token economies for classroom management. 
          Scriven (1986) wrote that the conventional "scientific paradigm" way of dealing
with these type of problems is not the business of science, they are value issues, and
must be sorted out by the citizenry. Instead, he proposes a paradigm for practical
educational research which subsumes educational evaluation, and which includes ethics,
political feasibility, a set of practical alternatives, and an overall practical significance.
Educational research is not, as he is suggesting, to be defined as all research that in any
way involves the concepts related to education, because that's too broad (it includes
learning theory), but as research that contributes to the facilitation of education, just as
medical research should not be defined as all research that involves concepts related to
medicine, since that brings in all physiological research, but simply as research
contributing to health. 
          The research on classroom teaching, educational programming, school
management, and classroom achievement have mostly been designed on the "quest for
knowledge" model (traditional scientific) rather than on the "improvement of practice"
model. Scriven's main point for educational evaluation stresses the acknowledgment that
evaluation research in schools can be a far more complex business than just a quest for
knowledge, a quest for classification, explanation, generalization, causation, and/or
prediction. 
          In reviewing some of the theoretical literature of inquiry in science and the social
sciences, it is hard to avoid the impression that there is a reluctance to confront the
issues of power, democracy, inequality, ethics, politics, and pragmatics in educational
research, evaluation, and in mainstream social science. Scriven proposed that one cannot
reconcile the widespread support for the doctrine of a value-free social science with the
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continued, inescapable practice of evaluation by social scientists, of the work and worth
of students, peers, and selves, except by invoking a kind of phobia which makes them
blind to the contradiction between their doctrine and their practice. This phobia, Scriven
called "value phobia," has blocked us for nearly a century from addressing explicitly the
methodology of evaluation and the systematic evaluation of our own practices in social
science research (1986, p.62). With this in mind, I explain how the theoretical literature
of inquiry in science and the social sciences can contribute to justifying the inclusion of
such values as social justice within an expanded framework of critical evaluation of
education reform.
Consideration of Inquiry in Science and the Social Sciences
Social Justice and the Distribution of Education
          Considerations of social justice are applied in the distribution of virtually every
social good. This is so much the case that, in the eyes of some, social justice simply has
to be proclaimed (for example in political programs) to henceforth characterize the
relations between people. In educational policy, arguments derived from social justice
played a role even before World War II and were fought over by political parties,
teachers' unions, left-wing intellectuals, and "pedagogical entrepreneurs" (Wesselingh,
1997). For them, the phenomenon of unequal participation was indeed a social problem,
a phenomenon of social injustice. It does not take much effort to see that predominantly
economic considerations have prompted the rapid expansion of equal- opportunities
research. Opinions about the just provision of educational opportunities combined with
economic need, have given the impetus to this research (Wesselingh, 1997). 
          Indeed, the Fall 1998 edition of Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis
includes one of the latest studies completed using Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM)
on the relationship between students' opportunity to learn (OTL) and their science
achievement. In this study, Jia Wang concludes that content exposure was the most
significant predictor of students' written test scores, and the quality of instructional
delivery was the most significant predictor of the hands-on test scores. In support for
these types of conclusions, Berliner and Biddle (1997) clearly argue that opportunity to
learn is the most significant predictor of academic achievement. These authors would be
content to know that "scientific methods" such as HLM techniques are pushing the
analysis of OTL variables at two level of instructional processes: the classroom level and
the student level. 
          On the cusp of a new millennium, we are searching for answers not in the homes,
economic backgrounds, and individual disadvantages of our students of public
education, it would seem that we are finally beginning to look at the quality of
instruction variables that exist in schooling processes instead of "blaming the victim."
Can we begin to ask why and how our school systems are failing our children, instead of
why and how these children are failing our school systems" If schools are to be held
accountable for the equitable delivery of educational opportunities and if social justice is
to take place within the halls of academic opportunity, the core of the education
performance indicator systems should include school and classroom information. 
          According to Winfield (1993), there are two main reasons for obtaining OTL
information. First and foremost, teacher and school factors need to be taken into
consideration in explaining students' achievement. Teacher and school variables directly
and indirectly influence student learning and student performance. Second, the new
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performance-based assessments make the collection of OTL information crucial
(National Council on Education Standards and Testing (NCEST), 1992). The
performance-based assessments require higher order thinking skills. This may put
students from low socio-economic status groups at a disadvantage. Studies have shown
that minorities, especially African American and Hispanics, are more likely to be put
into classroom with less learning opportunity even when ability is taken into account
(Gross, 1993). If future research on achievement continues to disregard OTL variables,
the achievement gap between majority and minority will continue to increase and a lack
of educational opportunity will continue to expand (Arreaga-Mayer & Greenwood,
1986; Madaus, West, Harmon, Lomax, & Viator, 1992).
Education as a good to be distributed gets the character of a good that
provides access to other goods. The key power of schooling is based on the
fact that education serves as a criterion for the distribution of all kinds of
other material and immaterial goods. The consequence of this development
is an instrumentalization of education. It evolves into an outstanding
example of an instrument of mobility in a society where now qualification
and rapidly growing demands for qualification create the space for moving
up and, to a lesser extent, moving down the social ladder. This is at least the
idea; the question of how education actually performs or is able to perform
its role as a social agency of distribution for various social groups is of
course not answered (Vervoort, 1975, p. 104).
For various groups this question still challenges our daily lives as critical evaluators,
leaders and researchers of social justice in education. 
          As generally acknowledged since the traditional bourgeois ideas of the
Enlightenment, the only valid criterion for determining who deserves which education is
achievement. Achievement as a criterion for selection stems from egalitarian principles
and is generally accepted in education as a just criterion. By now we know that this
distribution model has let to serious forms of social inequality. The assumption that in
schools everybody has equal opportunities to perform and thereby has a fair chance to
take part in the subsequent competition on the labor market, has proven to be a
misconception (Wesselingh, 1997). Education thus functions as an instrument for the
reproduction of social inequality and thereby reflects the irony of a principle derived
from egalitarian Enlightenment philosophy.
Social Justice and Education
Walzer's Spheres of Justice, published in 1983, can be seen as a reaction to John Rawls's
A Theory of Justice, published in 1971. Walzer's objective was to provide an
interpretation of what we contemporary Americans see as the essence of such concepts
as equality and justice. His book makes clear that a discourse on the selection criteria for
such an important social good as education is now needed more than ever. Reflection on
this topic should not be left to politicians and policy makers for in that case
considerations outside the sphere of justice will tend to dominate. Educational scientists,
sociologists of education, and educational evaluators in particular, should definitely be
more concerned with issues of social justice in education. Social justice is one of the
most important values that we should hope to secure in critical evaluation studies of
educational reform. 
          One of the goals of this article, besides arguing that critical evaluation is needed in
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order to begin fighting for social justice in education, is to recommend an open and
purposeful discourse about social justice in the reform of American public education
between the "public intellectuals" (Giroux, 1997, p.263), otherwise known here as the
social scientists, educational researchers, evaluators, and practitioners, a discourse about
social justice in the reform of American public education. The participation in discourse
that values a moral imperative and a political commitment to social justice in the
evaluation of education reform is crucial to understanding the ideology of a critical
evaluator.
Reaching Beyond the Incommensurable Perspectives
When it comes to dealing with such issues as social justice in education in a way that
recognizes its moral complexity and political nature, the social sciences have
"incommensurable perspectives" based in various traditions which have had different
ideas about the individual and his/her society (Wertsch, 1998). These views have been
updated but often at the cost of further fragmentation in the social sciences. The work of
the new "public intellectuals" is to translate and connect, the ideologies and
contributions of Aristotle's Realism, Plato's Idealism, Comtean Positivism, the Vienna
Circle of Scholars and their Logical Positivism, Constructivism, Postmodernism,
Critical Social Theory, and Feminist Theory. 
          The immeasurable challenge of the future is to look through diplomatic eyes
without the "terministic screens" (Burke, 1966) of our specializations and disciplines
that impair our vision. We could begin to address the phenomenon of public schooling,
its reform, and its evaluation within a politically honest analysis. By refocusing our
individual and collective powers into a moral and political analysis, critical evaluation of
education reform in the next century can begin to regain the democratic imperatives or
possibilities of public institutions. Exercising this moral and political "judgement" in
evaluation of education reform, as a social responsibility in public practice, requires
instrumental courage and conscience.
Analytic Primacy
Also this article aspires to begin a discourse beyond what politicians, educators, and
philosophers have debated for centuries, the extent to which education should develop
the individual or serve the needs of the state and society. The fact that this debate seems
to go on and on with no principled resolution in sight suggests that deeper issues may be
at stake. Namely, it suggests that academic dispute over what has "analytic primacy"
(Wertsch, 1998, p.9), the individual or society, may reflect an underlying debate, a
debate that cannot be resolved through rational argument. I am recommending that
evaluators of education reform lift the blinders of methodological habit, move beyond
their rational arguments, and discover how their own morals and politics are partly
reflected in their professional decisions. With this in mind we live in times of increasing
uncertainty as to how to reform public education. Part of the success of education reform
will depend on those who have the power to affect social change, who have control over
the knowledge base, who judge the worth and merit of educational programs, and what
kinds of morals and politics are profoundly ingrained within their minds, spirits, and
hearts.
Social Justice and Public Practice
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For the most part, educational research and evaluation have remained both moral and
political innocents in theory, practice, and policy. Part of this political innocence is
derived from self reproducing ideologies and scientific paradigms that have explicitly or
implicitly neglected moral and political issues. The conception of social justice, as
considered here, is not a privilege for some (meritocractic) but rather a birthright for all
(democratic) (Sirotnik, 1990). The value of social justice forms the foundation for
working towards the restoration of a moral and political theory in the evaluation of
public education reform, as part of a social responsibility in public practice, and as a part
of confronting the moral and political purposes of social inquiry and research. 
          The contributions of Wertsch, (1998), Giroux (1997), Prilleltensky (1994), Tsoi
Hoshmand, (1994), Howard (1985), Kohlberg (1984), Rawls (1971), Habermas (1971),
and Kuhn (1970) are offered as significant commissions to support the reconsideration
of our individual and professional decisions in education, by deliberating on our own
morals and politics. Reflections and deliberations on our own values, beliefs, passions,
and the reasoning for our professional decisions are mostly done outside of the confines
of our "professional lives." Thus we are left with the interesting and paradoxical
conclusion that what "ought" to be the most central in the evaluation of our schooling of
American children, the moral and political reasoning, becomes inevitably peripheral to
our public practice (Miller & Safer, 1993). In terms of articulating in-depth moral and
political positions related to evaluation in educational reform, these considerations and
decisions are vital to building and transforming schools that are struggling to achieve
democratic ideals.
Between the Potential and the Present
          Issues such as equality, democracy, race, gender, class, and poverty are certainly
integrated through variable means into the contemporary scholarship of educational
psychology, research, and evaluation. However, these issues and their historical,
political, moral, and economic meanings are rarely discussed in a comfortable forum
naturally or agreeably in the impregnable halls of academia. Therefore, the silent space
between the potential in education and the present crisis in public education is
successfully and safely insulated decade after decade. As a result, inquiry and discourse
between "public intellectuals" remain fixed in a non- political environment without
values, beliefs, and passions. This environment within an "ideology of neutrality"
became internalized in the consciousness of most researchers following the
establishment of the modern university. The links between the political agendas and
research were, and often remain, blurred by the legitimating function of social and
educational research. This can be seen in many educational evaluation studies that
accept the objectives of pedagogical programs and are organized to "explain" how the
objectives were reached.
Redefinition of Identity and Purpose
          No problem is more difficult and complex in the social sciences than that of
determining how morals and political values are embedded within the research
methodologies that we employ and the "academic" decisions that we make (Cronbach &
Associates, 1980; Hamnett, Kumar, Porter, & Singh, 1984; Fetterman, 1988; and
Sirotnik, 1990; Maruyama & Deno, 1992). That morals and political values should exist
in research is no longer denied (Warren, 1963; Fetterman, 1981; Freire, 1985; Apple &
Beyer, 1988; Habermas, 1990; Prilleltensky, 1994; Giroux, 1997; Kanpol, 1997;
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Wertsch, 1998). In terms of educational evaluation, the ideas found in this article,
reconfirm the conviction made by Sirotnik (1990) that the practice of evaluation is part
of the political authority structure of society, and that evaluation as an aid to public
decision making entails conceptions of democracy and social justice, even when these
conceptions are not immediately apparent. 
          House (1993) wrote that evaluation receives its authority not only from its
presumed "scientific method" but also from government endorsement itself. Within the
analysis of evaluation in advanced capitalist societies, House reviewed how
governments face serious problems in governing such a multicultural "amorphous mass
of people" (1993, p.vii) and how evaluation is both political and scientific authority
applied to practical decision and actions, particularly public decisions and actions. He
went on to explain how governments are capable of making decisions based on their
own political authority, but that it is easier to govern based on voluntary acceptance by
the populace attained through scientific persuasion, particularly when the populace is
pluralistic and increasingly non-traditional. In addition, House expanded the notion of
political and scientific authority by redefining formal evaluation as a new from of
cultural authority. Cultural authority can be manifested in the probability that
descriptions of reality and judgements of value will prevail as valid, an increasingly
difficult accomplishment in societies with disparate value systems (House, 1993).
Current literature in evaluation confirms that evaluation as a social activity is becoming
increasingly self-conscious about its own identity and purpose in the larger social order
(Cronbach & Associates, 1980; Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Rossi & Freeman, 1993; Patton,
1994; Scriven & Kramer, 1995; Chelimsky & Shadish, 1997).
Critical Evaluation
          Critical evaluation of education reform involves the practice of completing
empirical, historical, public and social work by employing explicit theories of justice
(House, 1976,1980) that require serious commitment, persistence, courage, conscience,
and conviction in order to restructure and transform education environments. Hence, as a
social practice, evaluation involves an inescapable ethic of public and social
responsibility that extends well beyond the immediate clientele by focusing on the
democratic purpose of schooling. Social justice in evaluation, then, concerns the manner
in which various interests are served. Critical evaluation should serve the interests not
only of stakeholders, sponsors, or the reformers, but of the larger society and of various
groups within society, particularly those most affected by the educational programs
under review. One of the aims of this article is to reiterate that institutions of higher
education must be seen as deeply moral and political spaces in which evaluators, indeed
intellectuals, assert themselves not merely as professional academics but as citizens,
whose knowledge and actions presuppose specific visions of public life, community, and
moral accountability (Giroux, 1997).
A Political Theory
          I propose here that critical evaluation represents a kind of political theory that
integrates explicitly the value of social justice into the practices, policies, and
responsibilities of evaluation of educational reform. Moreover, the political theory of
critical evaluation can be defined as the implicit and explicit social and professional
ethics of evaluation, and the moral and political consequences of these ethics, which
could reconstruct and reconsider the power relations in academia and public education.
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One of the reasons to begin a journey into a critical political perspective in educational
evaluation is to arrive at an account, a kind of "translation at the crossroads" (Wertsch,
1998, p.7), that would make it possible to link, but not reduce, one perspective of
"science" to another. Another reason is to begin addressing explicitly the methodology
of evaluation and systematically evaluate our own practices in social science research
(Scriven, 1986). 
          The task is to reflect, to discourse, and to collaborate with each other, between and
within disciplines, to dialogue about the human condition, especially the conditions of
inequalities that public institutions perpetuate in our democratic society. In order to talk
and listen to one another about social justice in education our "knowledge base" and our
morals and politics should be integrated into an ideology of hope and sincere
cooperation for a better future for children through education reform.
Overview
          A characterization of a critical evaluator will be advanced shortly. The role
divisions of academic versus service orientations existing in evaluation today are
described. The ideology of a critical theory of education, and critical social psychology
will then be reviewed in order to consider augmenting traditional positivist perspectives
of evaluation. Afterwards I give a brief summary of evaluation in general. Three
perspectives of evaluation and their purposes are explained, in order to illuminate the
more traditional positivist approaches in prevalent current evaluation literature and to
describe a spectrum of responsibility, purpose, and definition within the discipline of
evaluation. The three perspectives on the spectrum are those of accountability,
knowledge, and development. 
          Next, the limitations of contemporary and critical evaluation and how these
approaches may implicitly serve a particular set of social and political values is
forwarded. Integration of critical evaluation into a changing society, Fetterman's silent
scientific revolution, the ideas of practicing critical evaluation, the neutrality of schools,
and change in American schools are also presented. Subsequently this article
conceptualizes one important process that an evaluator must experience in the context of
Freirean pedagogy, so that a critical evaluator can begin the special role of critical
evaluation in educational reform. The implications of critical social thought for
evaluation in educational reform are then proposed. Finally, the second part of this
article begins by describing the interdisciplinary methods and procedures of the "how" of
critical evaluation, by introducing the integration of American public school law as
enhanced by collaborative consultation and the adversary-advocate oriented evaluation
model.
The Critical Evaluator
          Ernest R. House was the first prominent evaluation theorist to advocate valuing
based on principles of social justice (Patton, 1997). He has consistently voiced concerns
for democratizing decision making in that context, he has analyzed the ways in which
evaluation inevitably becomes a political tool in that it affects "who gets what." As
mentioned earlier, education itself, as well as educational evaluation can enhance fair
and just distribution of benefits or it can distort such distributions and contribute to
inequality. In considering judgements on programs, the social justice evaluator, the
critical evaluator, is guided by such principles and values as equality, fairness, and
concern for the common welfare (Sirotnik, 1990). 
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          Kenneth Sirotnik and Jeannie Oakes collaborated in this same endeavor by
considering the epistemological connections between critical theory and evaluation. To
be specific, they stated that if one accepts the proposition that inquiry is never value free
and accepts social justice as the ethical starting and ending points for moral argument,
then the accumulated body of work done by Freire (1973), Habermas (1971), and others
points the way toward a useful epistemological synthesis, one that they called critical
inquiry, that is evaluative by its very nature (Sirotnik & Oakes, 1990). By no means is
critical evaluation a new idea. Regardless, the argument for fighting for social justice
with critical evaluation of education reform is not a trivial one, but it is an argument that
I have extended with much interdisciplinary literature and paradigmatic considerations. 
          Michael Quinn Patton (1997) wrote that social justice and other similar principles
change the role of the evaluator from the traditional judge of merit or worth to a social
change agent. Many evaluators surveyed by Cousins, Donahue, and Bloom (1996) were
hostile to or at least ambivalent about whether evaluation, particularly a type of critical
evaluation, can or should help bring about social justice. Certainly, evaluators
undertaking such an approach need to be comfortable with and committed to it, and such
an activist agenda must be explicitly recognized, negotiated with, and formally approved
by primary intended users. From Michael Quinn Patton's utilization focused perspective,
using evaluation to mobilize for social action and support social justice are options on
the menu of evaluation process uses (1997).
          In this article, part of the argument is that wherever one places oneself on the
spectrum of evaluation responsibility, purpose, and definition; the evaluator can
earnestly acknowledge the powerful critical role that he or she may interpret in placing
judgement or giving merit to one of the most profound social activities in our lives, that
of educating our students and our children. This role as a critical evaluator can be found
anywhere on the spectrum. As typically happens with most spectrums the outlier
situation is pretty rare. A critical evaluator can produce empirically traditional research
designs in combination with critical social ideology, as long as one maintains a critical
stance towards methods, practice, and policy that addresses the more difficult questions
about the institutional problems in educational programs, those of democracy, power,
and inequality. Patton (1994) also advocated the use of "mind shifts back-and forth
between paradigms within one evaluation setting." 
          Most of the time, in most environments represented on the spectrum, "scientific"
positivist traditions about knowledge and postmodern critical social constructions of
knowledge are almost bound together, and evaluators must therefore always be prepared
to confront them both (Young, 1990). In Ethics, Politics, and International Social
Science Research, Hamnett, Kumar, Porter, and Singh (1984) compared and described
the aforementioned theoretical presuppositions such as that of positivist constructions of
knowledge and that of critical theories of knowledge. A significant point here is that a
critical evaluator can utilize the necessary tools and methods within shifting research
paradigms and changing concepts of knowledge construction, in order to augment
practices and policies which are continuously participating in a discourse that values a
moral imperative and a political commitment to social justice in the evaluation of
education reform. This understanding of a moral imperative and a political commitment
in educational evaluation is crucial in establishing explicitly the ideology of a critical
evaluator and in making one's analytical biases clear. 
          The following paragraph provides a synopsis of Sirotnik's and Oakes' review of
the three faces of inquiry and analysis (1990). Most educational researchers and
evaluators have been schooled in the tradition of the scientific method and the
hypothetico-deductive paradigm borrowed, presumably, from the physical sciences. But
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there are at least two other separate and general orientations for systematic inquiry
having strong philosophical roots and demonstrable utility for the social sciences. The
more familiar is the whole class of naturalistic methodologies. The second major
departure from the empirical analytical tradition is less well known and much more
separable, namely, the critique of knowledge. Its roots are also in the hermeneutical
tradition. But as a philosophy of inquiry, it represents a significant extension of
interpretive inquiry. Inquiry and analysis does not happen in a normative vacuum, as
they so eloquently stated.
          Sirotnik and Oakes (1990) also suspected that "an epistemological trap can be
created through assuming necessary and sufficient connections between method and the
political content of cognitive interests. Conducting empirical analytic inquiry, for
example, does not necessarily imply a hidden agenda of domination. On the other hand,
a hidden agenda of domination cannot in principle survive an inquiry based on critical
theory" (p.45). I agree with these authors that this, indeed, points the way out of the trap,
a truly practical unification of the three faces of inquiry requires the self correcting
epistemological stance that is made to order in a critical perspective. At the same time
evaluation must consider what kind of orientations are created in practice when these
epistemological and empirical stances are postured.
Academic Versus Service Organizations
          One of the most basic role divisions in the profession today is between academic
and service oriented evaluators, a division identified by Shadish and Epstein (1987)
when they surveyed a stratified sample of the members of the Evaluation Network and
the Evaluation Research Society, the two organizations now merged as the American
Evaluation Association. The authors inquired about a variety of issues related to
evaluators' values and practices. They found that responses clustered around two
contrasting views of evaluation. Academic evaluators tend to be at universities and
emphasize the research purposes of evaluation, traditional standards of methodological
rigor, summative outcome studies, and contributions to social science theory (Patton,
1997). Service evaluators tend to be independent consultants or internal evaluators and
emphasize serving the stakeholders' needs, program improvement, qualitative methods,
and assisting with program decisions (Patton, 1997). 
          According to Shadish and Epstein, " The general discrepancy between service
oriented and academically oriented evaluators seems warranted on both theoretical and
empirical grounds" (1987, p.560). The profession of evaluation remains very much split
along, these lines, but with new twists and perhaps, deeper antagonisms (Patton, 1997).
Patton goes on to explain how the "schism" erupted openly, and perhaps deepened, in
the early 1990's, when morality entered into the evaluation arena much more explicitly,
and the American Evaluation Association elected successive presidents who represented
two quite divergent perspectives. 
          Yvonna Lincoln (1991), in her 1990 presidential address, advocated what Patton
would call an activist role for evaluators, one that goes beyond just being competent
applied researchers who employ traditional scientific methods to study programs, the
academic perspective. She closed her speech by asserting that "my message is a moral
one." The following year, the American Evaluation Association president was Lee
Sechrest, who by his own definition represented the traditional, academic view of
evaluation. He objected to Lincoln's metaphorical call for a new generation of
evaluators. "I ask myself," Sechrest (1992) mused, "Where in our makeup are the origins
of this new creation so unlike us.... I sense a very real and large generational gap" (p.2). 
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          From this contemporary discourse in what the role divisions personify in
evaluation, one can tell that critical evaluators may be characterized as divergent or even
marginal in their theoretical and empirical presuppositions. Here lies the embedded
professional challenge of remaining open to pluralistic and cosmopolitan approaches
which adapt evaluation practice to new situations, mainly the situation of public
education institutions which are failing a growing disproportionate amount of
disadvantaged children thereby reproducing social and symbolic inequalities. Ultimately,
there is no one way to conduct an evaluation. This insight is crucial. The design of a
particular evaluation depends on the people involved and their situation.
Ideologies of Critical Theory, and Critical Social Psychology
          Traditionally social science and social psychology we are told, is a vocation of
scientific method, a devotion to truth that should not be compromised by the researcher's
idiosyncracies or other external forces and should not be unduly affected by the social
context in which the researcher operates (Hamnett et al., 1984). In the realm of the
natural sciences, statements often appear to be reaffirming this stance. For instance, in
practice there is very little to distinguish Soviet and U.S. nuclear physics. Changes in
theoretical presuppositions in one country are rapidly translated to others. 
          Social science and social psychology, however, do not have the canons of
theoretical perspective, verification, or even of data collection found in natural science
(Hamnett et al., 1984). Hamnett and his co-authors state that theoretically, the sociology
of knowledge has demonstrated how science (including the concepts, methods, and
procedures embodied) presupposes historically relative values, interests, and ideologies.
The taken for granted notion of the methodological neutrality of scientific method has
been undermined by theorists of many persuasions including that of critical theorists and
critical social psychologists (Wexler, 1983). I agree with Wexler when he writes that
conventional wisdom and common sense concedes that science is influenced by human
values and the political contexts of its expedition. This is why the evaluator of education
reform cannot posture a neutral, purely objective point of view on the object of his
research, especially in the reforming of such a social contract as education. 
          The writings of critical theory developed from the Institute for Social Research in
Frankfurt. The critical theorists are concerned with the role of values and ideology as
"part of the conceptual framework which defines what it is to have, i.e., scientific
knowledge about some phenomenon" (Sabia & Wallulis, 1983). Such a focus raises
important questions concerning social science research, ethics, and inevitably the
practice of evaluation in education. Critical theorists state that it would be incorrect to
claim that positivist doctrine is responsible for the unreflexive state of the research
ethics and politics debate in social science; the social, historical, economic, and political
context of research is of overwhelming importance (Sabia & Wallulis, 1983). 
          How one views the role of social research, its relations to political practice, and
how one assesses responsibilities, relationships, and appropriate conduct should be
explicitly negotiated up front with potential clients in terms of one's underlying
assumptions and ideological presuppositions. Moreover, critical research methodology is
distinctive from other approaches in that it traces the origin of our concept of validity
back to everyday human interaction. This is true, at least, for the specific brand of
critical methodology I advocate, which draws heavily from Habermas's work on validity
(Habermas, 1981, 1987). The later discourse of this critical evaluation perspective,
which can be embedded in a positivist scientific method, does not assume the posture of
rejection or exclusion, but rather will serve to provide an additive component to
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constructing knowledge and representing it with critical and conscious eyes. 
          I repeat what Lewis Carroll's Alice would have said, "things are not what they
seem." There is a difference between listening to the goals of reformers, and listening
attentively to the underlying assumptions forwarded by education reform efforts, and
consequently holding the reformers responsible for living up to their social ideals and
their program mission statements, mainly those mission statements that become framed
cultural symbols of what a program or a school represents. These framed paper
certificates, these mission statements, are usually strategically placed in the front office
of every public school and meticulously published in brochures summarizing the goals
and objectives that school districts represent to welcome potential inhabitants of the
communities they serve. If we can understand the central role played by validity claims
in normal human communication (symbolic or otherwise), we will then be able to
formulate the special requirements that a critical evaluator conducting formal inquiries
into social processes must employ to produce a trustworthy account. In critical
evaluation, the validity claims made by the evaluator do not differ in nature from validity
claims made by all people in everyday contexts. 
          Critical social psychology draws from the critical theory of the Frankfurt School
and the theoretical traditions of Marxism (Wexler, 1983). Philip Wexler (1983)
augmented and amplified what he perceived as developing tendencies in social relations
and in social psychological processes. Like Philip Wexler's expression of a need for
augmentation, I am asking those who study, practice, and use evaluation in education to
broaden and amplify their view of the applications and functions of evaluation with an
eye to the future. The evaluator could be responsible for reaching beyond mainstream
philosophy and practice in evaluation because the transforming of education and the
reforming of such a significant social activity requires an exceptionally conscious human
being. Like critical social psychology, a critical evaluator requires a theory which can
comprehend and facilitate social change movements. 
          Next I shall give an overview of evaluation in general, its development, and then
review three perspectives of evaluation and their purposes, in order to illuminate the
more traditional positivist perspectives in prevalent current evaluation literature. These
three perspectives again are those of accountability, knowledge, and development. By
looking at these three perspectives and their positions along a spectrum, I argue that the
evaluator must go beyond those delineated perspectives in mainstream evaluation theory,
policy and practice, in order to take a more critical posture toward both education and
the very process of thinking about education.
Evaluation 
        Evaluation as an academic discipline, a profession, and a government function has
only developed in the past four decades in the United States and in several other
industrially developed nations. In many nations, however, evaluation is in its infancy as
a standardized pursuit; and certainly on a global scale, evaluation is only beginning to
enter the scene (Chelimsky & Shadish, 1997). There is comfort in knowing, as
previously mentioned, that current literature in evaluation confirms that evaluation as a
social activity is becoming increasingly self- conscious about its own identity and
purpose in the larger social order and is beginning to systematically evaluate its own
methodology, utilization, values, and politics (Cronbach & Associates, 1980; Guba &
Lincoln, 1989; Rossi & Freeman, 1993; Patton, 1994; Scriven & Kramer, 1995;
Chelimsky & Shadish, 1997; House, 1993; Scriven, 1991). I would agree with
Chelimsky and Shadish (1997) when they propose that evaluators, in whatever field of
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evaluation they may be, are likely to find themselves, at least sometimes, at odds with
the political actors, systems, and processes in their own backyards, that rally against a
free flow of information and collaborative action which endangers the status quo. 
          Between 1965 and 1990 the methodology, philosophy, and politics of evaluation
changed substantially, partly in response to the structural transformations in an advanced
capitalistic society (House, 1993; Scriven 1991). The strongest stimulus to the
development of evaluation was Lyndon Johnson's Great Society legislation, which,
though not capable of changing U.S. society as a whole, certainly transformed
educational and social research. At Senator Robert Kennedy's insistence, the Elementary
and Secondary Act in 1965 mandated evaluation of programs for disadvantaged
students, and this spread to all social programs and beyond (McLaughlin, 1975). House
(1993) reviewed clearly in lay terms how evaluation moved from monolithic to pluralist
conceptions, to multiple methods, multiple measures, multiple criteria, multiple
perspectives, multiple audiences, and even multiple interests. 
          Methodologically, evaluation moved from a primary emphasis on quantitative
methods, in which the standardized achievement test employed in a randomized
experimental control group design was most highly regarded, to a more permissive
atmosphere in which qualitative research methods were acceptable. Mixed data
collection methods are advocated now in a spirit of methodological ecumenism (House,
1993). The following three perspectives describe more thoroughly the way that
evaluation is characterized in contemporary evaluation circles.
Examples of Purpose and Perspectives in Evaluation (Chelimsky &
Shadish, 1997)
Below find a review of the definitions and characterizations that Chelimsky and Shadish
write about in Evaluation for the 21st Century. They offer an inexhaustible listing of
possible purposes for evaluation. These purposes include the following: (a) to measure
and account for the results of public policy, and programs, (b) to determine the
efficiency of programs and their component processes, (c) to gain explanatory insight
into social and other public problems, (d) to understand how organizations learn, (e) to
strengthen institutions and improve managerial performance, (f) to increase agency
responsiveness to the public, (g) to reform governments through the free flow of
evaluative information, and (h) to expand results or efficiency measurement from that of
local or national interventions to that of global interventions such as reducing poverty
and hunger or reversing patterns of environmental degradation. All of these purposes
are, of course, worthwhile and legitimate reasons for conducting evaluations, but they
differ with regard to the questions they address and the kinds of methods needed to
answer these questions. 
          Chelimsky and Shadish propose that these different purposes, along with the
questions they seek to answer, seem to fall naturally into three general perspectives:
evaluation for accountability (e.g., the measurement of results or efficiency);
evaluation for knowledge (e.g., the acquisition of a more profound understanding
in some specific area or field); and
evaluation for development (e.g., the provision of evaluative help to help
strengthen institutions).
The methods of these three perspective are not mutually exclusive. Though they do
represent notable differences on a variety of dimensions. Each may be needed at
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particular times or policy points and not others (e.g., evaluation for knowledge may need
to precede accountability). Chelimsky and Shadish (1997) write that they appear to have
considerable explanatory power with regard to the current tension in the evaluation field.
(See Table 1 for further details.) Table 1, an adapted chart from Chelimsky and
Shadish's book (1997, p.21), shows the following three different perspectives and their
respective positions along five dimensions.
Table 1 
Three perspectives and their positions along five dimensions, 
adapted from Chelimsky and Shadish (1997, p.21)
DIMENSIONS ACCOUNTABILITY PERSPECTIVE 
KNOWLEDGE
PERSPECTIVE
DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE
PURPOSE
to measure results or 
value for funds expended:
to determine costs, to
assess efficiency
to generate insights
about public 
problems, policies,
programs, &
processes, to develop 
new methods and to
critique old ones 
to strengthen institutions 
to build agency or
organizational capability 
in some evaluative area
TYPICAL 
USES
policy use, debate and 
negotiation, agency 
reform, public use
enlightenment use, 
policy, research and 
replication, education,
knowledge base 
construction
institutional or agency use 
as part of the evaluative
process, public and policy
use
EVALUATOR 
ROLE distant
distant or close 
depending on 
evaluation design and
method
close, the evaluator is a 
"critical friend" or may be 
part of a team
ADVOCACY unacceptable unacceptable, but now being debated
often inevitable, but 
correctable through 
independent outside
review
POSITION 
UNDER 
POLICY 
DEBATE
can be strong (depending 
on leadership)
can be strong (if 
consolidated and 
dissemination 
channels exist)
uncertain (based on 
independence and 
control)
The Accountability Perspective
          From the standpoints of auditors, government sponsors of evaluation studies,
donors to international organizations, and many others, evaluation is done to establish
accountability. This involves the provision of information to decision makers, whether
they are in the public or private sector. Specific cause and effect questions about the
results in an accountability perspective might be: What happened to poverty levels among
the very poor as a result of development assistance provided" Did an educational
intervention or program produce more "effective" learning for all learners? Has teacher
training increased student achievement? 
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          Sometimes, questions about the results from an accountability perspective may
involve merely documentation of whether or not anything has changed after something
new has been tried. Normally, however, the ability to say that something is in fact a
"result" hinges on the ability to establish that it came about because of something else.
Many methods are used to answer these kinds of accountability questions including:
randomized designs, quasi-experimental designs, mixed multi-level designs, mixed
qualitative/quantitative designs, case studies, process studies, and research synthesis
designs.
The Knowledge Perspective 
          In the view of many researchers working independently in universities and other
evaluators in scientific institutions, evaluation is done to generate understanding and
explanation. Chelimsky and Shadish (1997) stated that the specific questions may not be
especially important to analyze here, given that it is the evaluator who decides what will
be asked and answered, and the topic generally follows from the researcher's prior work.
They explained that the evaluations associated with individual academic researchers, or
those of research teams, will be more likely to continue in depth cumulative inquiry into
particular areas or sectors of research than to be concerned with applying systematic
research methods to a variety of sectors, as with accountability and developmental
evaluations. 
          The larger purpose of the knowledge perspective is to increase understanding about
the factors underlying public problems, about the "fit" between these factors and the
policy or program solutions proposed, and about the theory and logic (or lack thereof)
that lie behind an implemented intervention. "These evaluations may employ any of the
methods discussed above, separately or in conjunction with each other, but the purpose of
knowledge gain leads logically to the use of the strongest designs as well as the greatest
clarity possible in explication and documentation of methods to facilitate replication or
later use in research synthesis and policy formulation" (1997, p.14).
The Developmental Perspective
          For government reformers, public managers, and others, evaluation is done to
improve institutional performance. It serves as a flexible tool that works: (a) to improve
the design of projects, (b) to measure and recommend changes in organization activities,
(c) to develop the indicators and performance targets needed to improve institutional
effectiveness and responsiveness, (d) to monitor, in an ongoing way, how projects are
being implemented across a number of different sites, and/or (e) to find out how
beneficiaries feel about an agency and its programs. To some accountability or
knowledge perspective evaluators, developmental evaluators may seem more like
evaluation "consultants" than evaluators, but those who do developmental work are
convinced that building evaluation capability is as important an evaluation function as
evaluation itself and that indeed, in some cases, evaluation cannot be done without
capacity building.
          Specific questions asked of evaluators in a developmental perspective might
include the following: What is the best research evidence with respect to formulating a
new program or modifying an old one? How can projects be structured so that they
produce evidence on the value of the intervention being tested? What is the most
appropriate agenda for the agency? Both process and outcome designs may be used in a
developmental perspective, depending on the evaluation question posed. In addition to
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the methods mentioned earlier, the formative methods used in the developmental
perspective include the following: monitoring, empowerment evaluation, cluster
evaluation, performance measurement, and research synthesis of both qualitative and
quantitative methods. A developmental evaluator becomes part of the design team
helping to shape what's happening both processes and outcomes, in an evolving, rapidly
changing environment of constant interaction, feedback, and change. Using mixed
methods and multiple criteria in this perspective are productions of some of the many
current trends in the practice of evaluation.
Demonstrating a Particular Set of Social and Political Values
          Although evaluation has developed as a discipline, a profession, and as a
government function in the past four decades by building on its scientific positivist
traditions and by systematically evaluating its own existence in the larger social order,
this particle emphasizes continual growth and augmentation of its practices, policies,
and responsibilities through a "conscientization" of evaluation's socio-political reality.
Over the years evaluation has come to be seen as political. Michael Quinn Patton, at the
National Evaluation Conference in Youngstown State University held in September
1998, summarized 12 recent trends in evaluation. One of them being the increasing
political sophistication and acknowledgment of the role of values and morals in
evaluation practice. There can be no doubt, that evaluation is influenced partly by
political forces, and in turn, has political effects. Whose interests are served and how
interests are represented in an evaluation are now very critical concerns in a society with
increasing disparate value systems. 
          In the earlier days, it was assumed that the interests of all parties were properly
reflected in the traditional outcome measures, but this assumption came to be
questioned, and it was recognized that different groups might have different interests and
might be differentially affected by the educational program and its evaluation (House,
1993). "Stakeholders" (those who had a stake in the program under review) became a
common concept, and representing stakeholder views in the evaluation became an
accepted practice. 
          The stakeholder concept is based on the prevailing pluralist-elitist-equilibrium
theory of democracy, which disclaims any normative judgements and which holds that
the current system of competing parties and pressure groups performs the democratic
function of equalizing the diverse and shifting political demands (MacPherson, 1987). It
is perceived that describing what others value is the stance best suited to the political
context in which evaluators operate, because decision making depends on the values
held by relevant policy makers and stakeholders. Presumably, these parties will use the
findings to make informed decisions. Neither the government nor the evaluator is
supposed to intervene to support any particular interests but rather only to provide
information that is value- neutral and interest-neutral. The interests of various groups
somehow dissolve into the values of decision makers and stakeholders. 
          However, one must note that today's professional evaluators sometimes become
evaluators by default. We represent an eclectic and diverse combination of various
professional, academic, and research areas. Shadish and Epstein (1987) found that 31%
of the respondents in their survey described their primary professional identity as that of
"evaluator" (p. 560). Others thought of themselves first as a psychologist, sociologist,
economist, educator, and so on, with identity of evaluator secondary. When both Charles
Murray (1983,1984) and Michele Fine (1983b, 1988) have been successful evaluators
representing a particular set of social and political values and interests, one has to
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acknowledge the diverse socio-political reality in which evaluators actually find
themselves in practice. 
          In two highly visible stakeholder evaluations funded by the federal government,
those of Cities-in-Schools and Jesse Jackson's PUSH/Excel program, the evaluations
worked against the interests of the program participants and the inner-city students
which the programs were supposed to serve, thus calling into question the justice of
these evaluations (House, 1988; Stake, 1986). The results of the PUSH/Excel evaluation
were used not only to discredit the program but also to question Jesse Jackson's ability to
manage large enterprises during ensuing presidential campaigns. In truth, the stakeholder
model was never implemented (House, 1988; Stake, 1986). Charles Murray, the
evaluator in both cases, substituted a technocratic model of evaluation and expressed his
disdain for the stakeholder concept in his article Stakeholders as Deck Chairs (1983).
Although the stakeholder approach seems firmly entrenched, there is disagreement about
how to implement it. In reality, stakeholders do not have equal power to influence and
utilize the evaluation, nor do they have equal protection from the evaluation. 
          These types of problem in evaluation led into a discussion of misuse of findings.
The fact that so much standardized achievement testing is reported to the public in
general and its interpretation left to the media or government officials makes misuse
particularly salient (House, 1993). In fact, the professional standards for evaluation
developed by a committee led by Stufflebeam, devoted considerable space to issues of
misuse, but the context in which evaluation results are presented does not lend itself to
the employment of such standards, even though the standards are widely accepted in the
evaluation community itself. How misuse of findings and disparate interests can be
curtailed is by no means clear. The professional standards for evaluation developed by
the Joint Committee dramatically reflected the ways in which the practice of evaluation
had matured in 1981. In 1994, revised standards were published following an extensive
review spanning several years. 
          While some changes were made in the 30 individual standards, the overarching
framework of four primary criteria (utility, feasibility, propriety, and accuracy) remain
unchanged. However, the profession of evaluation has not yet developed to the point of
reflecting a common core of practices and principals as demonstrated by the original
professions, divinity, law, and medicine (House, 1993). We must pay attention to the
fact that certification programs and higher education programs in evaluation and
evaluation research are a very recent development in the discipline (Chalimsky &
Shadish, 1997). For a deeper understanding of how the original professions compare
with evaluation as a profession, refer to House's (1993) book, Professional Evaluation .
Limitations of Contemporary Evaluation and a 
Reflection on American Public School Law
          There are limitations to contemporary and critical evaluation frameworks. The
problem of addressing multiple values and interests and how they should be represented
in an "equitable" evaluation can take one directly into the realm of social justice and the
recognition of the assumptions, character, and consequences of conventional forms of
educational evaluation and American public school law. The problem of evaluation
representing a particular set of political and social values (i.e., a broadly conservative
set) also raises some serious questions about evaluation in general. Although the
socio-political reality of multiple stakeholders and evaluators who have legitimate
values and sometimes conflicting interests is recognized, how these values and interests
are legitimized will become one of the most important challenges for educational
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evaluation in the future, especially for critical evaluation of education reform. How to
synthesize, resolve, and adjudicate all these multiple multiples in our increasing
multicultural and amorphous society remains a formidable question, as indeed it does for
the larger society. 
          One thing we do know is that the socio-political reality in evaluation of public
programs, both in education and health, often works in favor of higher income groups
and against equity despite the stated objectives (Birdsall & Hecht, 1995; Paul, 1991;
Fine, 1983). When we look at the political structures and the broad organization of
society, resource allocation and subsequent delivery of services and programs tend to be
skewed in favor of those who have more "voice" (Fine, 1983; Fine & Weis, 1993). In
many cases, powerful stakeholders or groups, which are able to effectively demonstrate
their interest in receiving social services and "effective" or "successful" social programs,
manage to get the lion's share of the resources and the funds. It is no secret that the
United States of America is one of the last Western industrialized nations to base their
educational financing system on that taxation of largely differentiated property values.
This financial arrangement alone should illuminate some of the deeper issues at stake in
the evaluation of public education environments. 
          American public school law and its case history has demonstrated time and again
that there are very few instances where citizens have been able to prove that state school
finance systems result in revenue disparities which violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1973, in the case of San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, Mr. Justice Powell, delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court.
He said, "to the extent that the Texas system of school financing results in unequal
expenditures between children who happen to reside in different districts, we cannot say
that such disparities are the product of a system that is so irrational as to be invidiously
discriminatory...." 
          If disparate allocation of governmental benefits can be justified on the basis of
reasonable classification or the interests involved are not fundamental, then statutes will
be regarded as constitutional (Alexander & Alexander, 1992). The court in the
Rodriguez case basically ruled that a state legislature can heap benefits on some wealthy
school districts and deprive others of fiscal resources and not offend the federal Equal
Protection Clause. Thus representing the educational interests of disenfranchised
stakeholders, even within the American public school law domain, can be confounded
with many inherently unequal and disparate value systems.
          In other instances, our social service institutions, such as education and health, are
able to shape the systems to serve their own personal and professional goals at the
expense of equitable delivery (Paul, 1991). Problems created by the limited voice of
politically weak or disenfranchised stakeholders are exacerbated in educational
evaluation, when combined with direct provision of services in virtual public
monopolies of the "best teachers," the allocation of "best practices" in education, and the
provision of high quality curriculum and professional development training which are
centralized in higher socio-economic communities. Ultimately, citizens have limited
capacity to improve the public education they are provided through participating,
informing, and making recommendations. This is especially true of lower
socio-economic community stakeholders which have traditionally been limited in their
capacity to have their "voice" heard without legal representation (Fine, 1993; Oakes &
Guiton, 1995). 
          Historically, when interests have been ignored and educational procedures have
been violated, lower socio-economic communities, minorities, exceptional populations,
and limited English proficient citizenry have had to turn to the legal system for any kind
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of adjudication (Paul, 1991; Haring, McCormick, & Haring, 1990; Oakes & Guiton,
1995). Similarly, in terms of fighting for social justice in education, evaluation of
education reform efforts could benefit from addressing some of the principals in
American public school law. This idea will be further developed in Part II below.
However, for the time being, contemporary evaluation which was invented to solve
social problems, can be afflicted with many of the problems it was meant to solve. 
          Another limitation of critical evaluation in education reform pertains to its
inherent questioning of the institutional character of education. By producing
educational criticism and value judgements of institutional programs and personnel, in
conjunction with the ideologies of critical theory of education, critical social psychology,
and Freirean pedagogy, critical evaluators risk certain professional isolation from the
mainstream. The socio-political reality in which one can survive as an evaluation
professional of education reform becomes integrated into a world with those individuals
that agree with your views, particularly those who agree with your views on social
justice and in general the democratic purposes of public schooling. As critical evaluators
conduct evaluations to address the elimination of inequality and the improvement of
those who are least well off, they will come into conflict and threaten established
authority. Any method of evaluation that claims to be nonobjective and value-laden will
be marginalized. Society expects evaluation to be based on scientific authority.
However, I expect the notion of what is scientific to be substantially redefined. The
concepts of objectivity, scientific methodology, and validity will be recast to
accommodate different evaluation approaches (House, 1993).
Integration of Critical Evaluation into a Changing Society
          Evaluation continues to become ever more methodologically diverse. Evaluation
in general draws from the theoretical foundations of many fields and is
multi-disciplinary and multi-faceted in nature (Chelimsky & Shadish, 1997). It is by now
well established that the full array of social science methods belongs in the evaluator's
methodological tool kit, including tools from psychology, statistics, education,
sociology, political science, anthropology, and economics (Cronbach & Associates,
1980). When the critical logical and analysis tools given to us by critical theorists and
social psychologists are included into an evaluation design, the role that evaluators play
in judging the worth of educational reform efforts is elaborated. Chelimsky and Shadish
(1997) supported the notion that it is often uncomfortable to stir oneself from familiar
cultural, ideological, topical, conceptual, and methodological niches. 
          However uncomfortable or reactionary one may feel to the content of this article,
there is a message: it is that evaluations of educational reform efforts in the next century
can and probably will be far more powerful and influential than they are today. This is
because of the ever increasing complexity of social, economic, technological, political,
and cultural tensions which are questioning the very integrity and purpose for public
education as a whole (Giroux & Aronowitz, 1991). The growing populations with
disparate value systems and socio-economic levels and the increasing minority
populations in this country will demand to participate more legitimately in the
reformation of their own education. Consequently evaluation will have to redefine its
identity, its purpose and practices. 
          Lee Cronbach, in 1980, advanced the position that the theory of evaluation has to
be as much a theory of political interaction as a theory of how to determine facts or how
knowledge is constructed (Cronbach et al., 1980). Even so, 18 years later, we still do not
seem to understand political processes very well, especially their dynamic nature. This
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gap in understanding and consciousness is especially true for evaluators in the field of
education where we are determining "facts" and constructing knowledge about
educational programs designed to improve teaching and learning in the public school
domain. We can begin bridging this gap in consciousness to understand the political
nature of evaluation by looking at our own ideologies as evaluators. Critical thought,
indeed, criticism, is essential to enable us to act in ethically and politically just, to say
nothing of intellectually honest, ways. Critical thought entails questioning, reflection and
thoughtful interaction with the information and body of knowledge at hand. Education
then becomes an active and constructive process of continual critical growth (Dewey,
1944).
          Fundamentally, I am recommending here that evaluators, as leaders of educational
reform efforts, become more critical and vigilant about the questions they are contracted
to answer and about the more profound functions of education programs and practices
under the rubric of a critical theory of education (Giroux, 1983b; Young, 1990; Apple &
Beane, 1995; Apple 1996, Apple & Carlson, in press ). In addition, these same
evaluators could integrate the logic of traditional psychology with the logic of critical
social psychology to begin the rethinking of education as a social project and a social
process. The purpose of this rethinking is to expand on positivist traditions of
considering an incremental perspective on methodological and research design issues in
evaluation, into a more open critical ideology of practice and policies (Fetterman, 1988;
Maruyama & Deno, 1992). These schools of thought, approaches, and particular issues
should not be eliminated. We should consider these issues together with the notion that
evaluation of education places us in a particularly sensitive arena within the confounds
of social and human science (Fetterman & Pitman, 1986; Fetterman, 1988).
Silent Scientific Revolution
          Fetterman (1988) argued that there is a silent scientific revolution in evaluation
and that educational evaluation is experiencing a change in direction. A critical
component of this change is a shift in the paradigms underlying the method and aim of
research (Lincoln, 1986). David Fetterman further suggests that a marked shift is taking
place in the professional allegiance of evaluators. This shift in allegiance, he says, is not
a simple linear development. As summarized in Fetterman's book (1988), this shift goes
beyond perceiving evaluation as a set of chronological transformations that travel from
traditional positivist approaches to dominant qualitative forms of evaluation, including
ethnography, naturalistic inquiry, generic pragmatic (sociological) inquiry,
connoisseurship/criticism, and phenomenography. Rather he illustrates some significant
moments of metamorphosis, revealing the process of shifting allegiance to a circular and
interactive paradigmatic perspective. 
          Similarly, I call on evaluators to lift the blinders of methodological habit, to
increase the ideological options and backgrounds available to them, to go beyond any
single discipline, and to build on tradition by engaging the wisdom of critical social
thought. This article is simply describing a possible interplay between the sciences and
between the contemporary perspectives in evaluation. 
          Whether using the perspectives of accountability, knowledge or development, or
any combination thereof, additional questions could be examined as the
evaluation/research design is imposed on the school culture and setting (Maruyama &
Deno, 1992). Critical evaluators of education reform could also listen to emerging
questions that are integral to the improvement and restructuring of social projects and
social processes, by attending to their own consciousness and motivations (Young,
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1990). Later I will review Paolo Freire's construction of conscientization (Hamnett,
Kumar, Porter, & Singh, 1984, p.100) to describe this experience as necessary for
critical evaluators of education reform. 
          School and university researchers/evaluators who are taking on the challenge of
restructuring schools and school systems in urban areas are involved essentially in the
transformation of existing bureaucracies, bureaucracies that have had the power to
control what is taught and how schools are run (Kretovics & Nussel, 1994). Clearly
American education is organized in a bureaucratic form. Kretovics and Nussel confirm
that at any level, national, state, or local, the traditional pyramidal, hierarchical
arrangement is in effect. Proposals for reform of public schools and their evaluations
must consider how the bureaucratic functionaries might respond. Since bureaucracy is
"an institutionalized method of organizing social conduct in the interest of
administrative efficiency," the issue of response is a genuine concern (Kretovics &
Nussel, 1994).
Practicing Critical Evaluation
          In the public school domain, genuine concern is adequate but more critical thought
and action are needed within the world of educational bureaucracy. One way of
practicing critical thought and action for critical evaluation would be to negotiate these
ideological and theoretical presuppositions up front with one's clients and then
deliberately confront issues of institutionalized power, democracy, and inequality in the
educational programs and reform efforts. One can do this by organizing specific research
designs and relationships centered around the concept of listening to the multiple voices
in education and its programs. Fine and Weis (1993) witnessed and wrote about the
practices and consequences of silencing in public schools. I do not think that evaluators
are far from becoming partners in these implicit practices. Battling the dynamics of
power and privilege that nurture, sustain, and legitimate silencing in education is the
first purposeful step that a critical evaluator can take to interpret his powerful role as a
transformative agent for social change. Creating flexible, authentic, and reflexive
relationships with the stakeholders and with the existing bureaucracies during the
process of evaluation is a second step that the critical evaluator can take towards
completing a critical evaluation (Schon, 1983). 
          If innovative and well meaning educational programs or educational reform efforts
are developed to improve the education of all students in public schools, then the
evaluator of these programs has a very special and conscious role in creating
opportunities for authentic discourse about these difficult issues that go beyond the
successes or failures (outcomes) of children within the structural and organizational
components of educational practice. The role of the evaluator and the ability to
communicate and address the challenging issues such as democracy, power, and
inequality to clients in the field of education, especially in the future, will be essential to
transforming social activity for social change. Michelle Fine and Lois Weis (1993)
included the following quote in their book:
It is a false dichotomy which suggests that academics and/or intellectuals
can only speak to one another, that we cannot hope to speak with the
masses. What is true is that we make choices, that we choose voices to hear
and voices to silence. If I do not speak in a language that can be understood,
then there is little chance for dialogue. We must be ever vigilant. It is
important that we know who we are, who we are speaking to, who we most
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want to hear us, who we most long to move, motivate, and touch with our
words (p.2).
The Neutrality of Schools (Social Darwinism Revisited)
          Jeannie Oakes (1986) stated that in their general indictment of schools, the authors
of the evaluation studies and reform reports do not attach particular importance to the
fact that schools fail to serve all students equally well. Certain topics like
institutionalized power, democracy, and inequality are not explicitly addressed because
there is a "silenced" understanding of the status quo in educational practice.
Consequently, the evaluators and reformers in the commentary made by Jeannie Oakes
do not consider as targets of information or understanding the school content and
processes that limit school achievement for poor and minority students. Schools, in
general, are often seen as essentially neutral, and the reforms are presented as color-blind
and affluence blind. Jeannie Oakes (1986, 1995) further argued that current reform
efforts do not address the unequal quality of school facilities, programs, materials,
counseling, expectations, and instruction. No interest is shown, for example, in the
unequal distribution of competent teachers. Neither do they address school
organizational changes likely to equalize access to high quality educational contexts
such as desegregation, the elimination of tracking, and the reconceptualizing of
vocational education programs. 
          Thus by extracting the logic of critical theory and critical social psychology, I
would extend the "meta-evaluation" done by Oakes, in saying that the evaluators of
these reform efforts are additionally hard pressed to face squarely the "silent" demons
lurking behind the institutional practices in public education. Even though a common
issue is made of increasing the skills and knowledge of teachers, the assumption is that
teachers simply need to get better at what they've always done. Also there is an
assumption that all the evaluator has to do is to evaluate how the teacher is teaching and
whether the outcomes are effective learning. There is little or no mention of the need for
teachers to be more knowledgeable about how poverty, racism, and limited expectations
affect the educational treatment of poor and minority children (Levine, 1971; Coleman,
1981; Fine, 1983,1994). Indeed there is no direct mention and acknowledgment of these
issues on any explicit level within the hierarchical structure and bureaucracy in
education (Levine, 1971; Coleman, 1981; Fine, 1983,1994).
          Subsequently, mainstream evaluation of these reform efforts in teaching practices
and educational programs misses a crucial part of the picture about how schools are
functioning for all children. If we as evaluators do not ask deliberate questions about
institutionalized power, democracy, quality of instruction, and inequality within the
public school domain, during the process of evaluation, then we become one more
vehicle that perpetuates an already neutral state of mind about the world of education
and its goals for society. While many faults are found with schools, unfairness is not one
of them. In addition, the omission of these concerns and "silent" demons in evaluation
and education reform efforts makes clear the prevailing conviction that schools, as they
are now, are neutral places (Coleman, 1975; Oakes, 1986; Fine, 1994).
Change in American Schools
          Although there is a perception that change needs to occur in virtually all American
school districts, including those serving the wealthiest suburbs, the success of the reform
movement will be measured ultimately by its impact on our largest most troubled public
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school environments. For it is in our largest cities and our most rural districts that the job
of the schools is most difficult, given the often overwhelming social and economic
circumstances of students living in desperately impoverished neighborhoods (Oakes &
Sirotnik, 1986). These are the neighborhoods most in need of transformed schools, and it
is in these neighborhood schools that the evaluator can choose to undertake his
exceptional role of being a vehicle for change and transformation. 
          Jonathan Kozol in Savage Inequalities (1991) took readers inside schools in poor
neighborhoods and forced them to see the places impoverished children are compelled to
go. Kozol (1991) commented on more than the physical, economic, and social
inequalities among different types of school, those with affluent children, and those with
children from poor homes. He addressed the very "ethos" of a school as maintained by
the social-class position of the students. Theodore Sizer in Horace's Compromise (1984) 
also characterized this difference between schools quite modestly:
Among schools there was one important difference, which followed from a
single variable only: the social class of the student body. If the school
principally served poor adolescents, its character, if not its structure, varied
from sister schools for the more affluent. It got so I could say with some
justification to school principals, tell me about the income of your student's
families and I'll describe to you your school. (p.6)
Critical educators such as Michael W. Apple, Henry A. Giroux, Paolo Freire, Jeannie
Oakes, Gloria Ladson-Billings, and Maxine Greene would probably agree that
evaluation and research in impoverished neighborhood schools presents the critical
evaluator with an exceptional challenge in social responsibility. Hence, these
impoverished neighborhoods, where educational reform proponents advocate change,
improvement and restructuring of schools, could be the environments that create
wonderful opportunities for evaluators to maintain a critical stance toward theory,
research, practice, and social policy.
Freirean Pedagogy
          The statement "All men are created equal" is one that resounds throughout
American history. The words are found in the Declaration of Independence and Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address; they are also paraphrased and applied in numerous settings. For
educators and educational evaluators, it has meant that American schools are charged
with offering every child equality of educational opportunity. This concept of equality of
educational opportunity is one that has been implicit in most educational practices
throughout the period of public education in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
(Coleman, 1981). However, no white suburb in America would long tolerate the low
academic achievement taken for granted in the urban, or rural public schools attended
largely by African- Americans, Hispanics, and poor children. 
          In big cities all over the United States, minority students by the tens of thousands
leave school each year, some as dropouts, some as graduates, utterly unprepared to
participate in and contribute to a democratic society (Oakes & Sirotnik, 1986). They lack
the skills that will allow them to obtain gainful employment, and they are devoid of the
preparation that will lead to success in further education. Paolo Freire would
characterize this lack of skills and preparation as the "inability to act upon and transform
one's world" (Hamnett et al., 1984). Consequently he would say that the democratic
society failed to move this person toward the ever-new possibilities of a fuller and richer
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life individually and collectively through the auspices of public education (Hamnett et
al., 1984). 
          Paolo Freire is most often recognized for his literary and practical works as an
educator. His study and conduct in this field have produced radically new philosophical
and political insights. His basic assumption is that people are seen to be always in the
process of developing. He says that the characteristic of the human species is its
repeatedly demonstrated capacity for transcending what is merely given, what is purely
determined (Hamnett et al., 1984). From Freire's point of view, education, or any form
of activity directed at social change, can never be neutral; it can only be used to
dominate or liberate people. Although this dichotomy is limited in my opinion, these
extremes serve their purpose in explaining unique ideological commitments to social
change, especially as social science researchers and evaluators in education. I proposed
here that evaluation of public educational programs, as a form of activity directed at
social change, should follow Freire's recommendation for conscientization:
Conscientization refers to the processes in which men, not as recipients, but
as knowing subjects, achieve a deepening awareness both of the
socio-political reality which shapes their lives and their capacity to
transform that reality (Freire, 1970b).
This notion conveys the realization that nobody can help or assist others without their
participation; otherwise the helper is led only to treat people as objects vulnerable to
control and manipulation from outside (Freire, 1973). Here we can reflect upon what
such a perspective would require in evaluation of public educational programs.
Conscientization is at least one experience that critical evaluators should pass through in
order to become educational leaders and change agents for educational reform.
Implications for Evaluators of Education Reform
          Undoubtedly the purposes, methods and functions of evaluation would change if
one was to adhere to the philosophical and ideological underpinnings of critical theory,
critical social psychology, and Freirean pedagogy. The question remains: would a critical
evaluator actually go beyond traditional methodological concerns to design his policy
and practice to deliberately address difficult and possibly uncomfortable issues such as
institutionalized power, democracy, and inequality in education? Courage, persistence
and conviction are presented here as three crucial elements that will consistently be
needed for critical evaluation of educational reform. In addition to these three elements a
critical evaluator could benefit from continual reflection about one's own changing
beliefs and landmark experiences. 
          The need for courage, persistence, and conviction seems fairly obvious but
somehow we do not seem to talk about these character traits explicitly. Speaking out, in
situations that may include numerous political and bureaucratic agendas, all with
different viewpoints and axes to grind, and also insisting on the right to independence in
speaking out, takes a strong stomach. Even in the political and cultural environments
occurring toward the middle of the spectrum, the normal skepticism of the evaluator is
unwelcome amongst the pervasive enthusiasm for one program or another. But as we
move down the spectrum toward differing ideologies, doubting the conventional wisdom
becomes such an offensive tactic as to deconstruct credibility and solid reputations. 
          It also takes fortitude or conviction and strong resistance not to succumb to
political or bureaucratic blinders of one sort or another. In my experience with the higher
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echelons of public education evaluation, both as a teacher and as a district based advisor
of educational practice, these blinders lure evaluators into wanting to become political
and "institutional" players on the national scene. There is an insidious temptation to
avoid ideological and philosophical battles to the promise of glorious career rewards as
compensation for obedience. This possible temptation is one of the reasons why there
needs to be extensive research started in discovering the implicit and explicit social and
professional ethics of different types of evaluators, especially evaluators in education
reform. It takes persistence and courage to refuse sponsors the answers they want to
hear, and it takes conviction and certainly conscience to ask deeper more resounding
questions. Goethe said, "Possessions lost, nothing lost. Principles lost, something lost.
Courage lost, everything lost" (quoted in "Visions of Public Service," 1986, p.12).
A Beginning to the Methods of Critical Evaluation
Part II: The "How" of Critical Evaluation
          National policymakers, educational leaders, "public intellectuals", and children in
disadvantaged situations can benefit from critical evaluation, but not in the same ways
and not with the same evaluator roles. Neither more nor less activism, in my judgement,
is morally superior. Various degrees of activism involve different ways to practice as an
evaluator, often in different arenas. Indeed, how activist to be, involves consideration of
an evaluation's purpose, decisions about intended users and uses of evaluation, and the
evaluator's own values and commitments, all of which need to be made explicit. The
challenge will be to create appreciation and space for such diversity among both those
within and outside the profession who have a single and narrow view of evaluation and
its practice. The debate will and should, go on, for that is how we discover implications
and ramifications of diverse approaches, but I hope and foresee no desire to turn back
the clock to a single dominant perspective. 
          By now, there should be no doubt as to the rationale for making a space for critical
evaluation in the reform of public education. Because of the complexity of the task of
reconceptualizing the evaluation process toward a process that contains an explicit
normative social goal, that of social justice, and a process that is designed for purposes
of fundamental change, the arguments in this section will only begin to delineate a 
preliminary path toward a methodology for critical evaluation. However, a more detailed
and experienced methodology for critical evaluation would require further conceptual
and empirical investigation and time. Essentially the utilization of American public
school law, both state and federal statues, are combined with the adversary oriented
evaluation model in order to propose briefly that these statutes can serve as merit criteria
for determining the value and worth of educational programs. Critical evaluation will be
augmented by commissioning the principles and rules of American public school law as
additional references. Lastly, the conclusion elaborates on the roles and responsibilities
of an evaluator in order to highlight the significance of our commitment and vision.
Adversary Oriented Evaluation (AOE)
          Adversary Oriented Evaluation is a rubric encompassing a collection of divergent
evaluation practices. In its broadest sense, the term refers to all evaluations in which
there is planned opposition in the points of view of different evaluators or evaluation
teams, and a planned effort to generate opposing points of view within an overall
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evaluation. In 1965, Guba suggested that educational evaluation might use aspects of the
legal paradigm. I am suggesting not only to use certain aspects of the legal paradigm, but
also to use the state and federal statutes as merit criteria for determining the worth and
value of educational programs, especially those instructional programs that serve
disadvantaged students. 
          Next, Worthen, Sanders, and Fitzpatrick (1997) presented a provocative rationale
for such an approach. If trials and hearings were useful in judging truth claims
concerning patents, products, crimes, civil disobedience, and if human testimony were
judged acceptable for determining life or death, as in the judicial system, then might not
legal proceedings and public education law be a useful metaphor for educational
program evaluation? Might there be merit in educational evaluation "trials," in taking
and cross-examining human testimony, and in using the concept of advocacy to ensure
that evaluation fairly examined both sides of issues? 
          The first self-conscious effort to follow a particular adversary paradigm was made
in the early 1970's by Owens. Designed to test the usefulness of a modified judicial
model, the evaluation focused on a hypothetical school curriculum and included pretrial
conferences, cases presented by the "defense" and "prosecution," a hearing officer, a
"jury" panel of educators, charges and rebuttals, direct questioning and redirected
questions, and summaries by the prosecution and defense (Worthen et al., 1997). The
reports (Owens, 1973) were intriguing to the community of evaluators and led to further
conceptual and empirical work on the adversary approach. For further explanation of the
development, applications, strengths, and limitations of this kind of approach see
Worthen, Sanders, and Fitzpatrick (1997). 
          Several approaches that qualify as adversary oriented do not employ hearing
processes. Kourilsky and Baker (1976) described an adversary model in which two
teams prepared, respectively, affirmative and negative appraisals of that which was
evaluated (the preparation stage); met to present the views to one another,
cross-examining and critiquing one another's contentions on pre- specified criteria (the
confrontation stage); and engaged in open-ended discussions until reconciliation of
views was attained and translated into written recommendations in a single report.
Levine (1974) proposed that a resident adversary or critic might be assigned to the
research project to challenge each bit of information collected, searching for other
plausible explanations. The Stake and Gjerde (1974) strategy of having two evaluators
prepare separate reports summing up opposing positions for and against the program is
yet another variant of the adversarial approach that does not depend on a hearing format.
These proposals are all consistent with what Worthen et al. (1997) also called "critical
evaluation."
          Donmoyer (n.d) proposed a "deliberative" approach to evaluation, which focused
on assessing and balancing alternative conceptions of reality and the differing value
positions underlying these conceptions. "Because deliberative evaluation is primarily
concerned with fostering understanding of alternative conception of reality," the
evaluator's role is "to foster interaction and facilitate communication among
representatives of various stakeholder groups...." (p.9-10). Donmoyer saw different
world-views as the cause of underlying disputes, which could be resolved by open
presentation of alternative views in some type of forum.
          Worthen et al. (1997) reviewed three general approaches to adversary evaluation:
(1) adaptations of the legal paradigm and other "two-view" adversary hearings, (2)
adaptations of quasi- legal and other adversary hearings where more than two opposing
views are considered, and (3) use of debate and other forensic structures in adversary
evaluation. The third type is particularly interesting for critical evaluation purposes of
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establishing merit criteria using the public education laws and codes that can serve as
partial "anchors" or references for determining the quality of instructional and
educational program delivery. The following is a practical representation of how the
education laws and codes can be used as partial "anchors" or references.
          For example, if the instructional effectiveness of programs such as bilingual
education or special education was to be evaluated at a predominantly Hispanic low
socio-economic elementary school in Texas, the critical evaluator could turn to the
Texas Law School Bulletin (1996) for crucial information on the state's public education
laws and codes that applied to the "Educational Programs" (Chapter 29, Subchapters A
& B). A critical evaluation could include an investigation of the history of eligibility,
assessment, enrollment, and placement into the bilingual and special education programs
as defined in the Texas Law School Bulletin. Similar to the study completed by Jia
Wang (1998), as mentioned previously in this article, the evaluation design would also
include investigating the quality of instructional delivery, content coverage, content
exposure, and content emphasis (opportunity to learn variables as described by Jia
Wang, 1998). 
          In some instances, if the educational development of certain disadvantaged
students, such as their language proficiency and academic achievement or failure were
called into question, the evaluation team could review carefully the student's educational
history by comparing it to the eligibility criteria, assessments, enrollment, and
instructional placement education codes as set out by the Law Bulletin. These education
codes could be the "anchors", the starting points or references to further the
understanding of current and past campus and district based educational practices that
involve high risk decision making. Education code 29.056, Enrollments of Students in
Program is an example of this kind of "anchor" or reference:
The agency shall establish standardized criteria for the identification,
assessment, and classification of student of limited English proficiency
eligible for entry into the program or exit from the program. The student's
parent must approve a student's entry into the program, exit from the
program, or placement in the program. The school district or parent may
appeal the decision under Section 29.064 (p. 120).
Again, the laws and codes can be used as additional references for the evaluators to
place classroom instruction, the school, the program, or the school district, in context to
legal precedent and required administration. Because a public school is a governmental
agency, its conduct is circumscribed by precedents of public administrative law
supplemented by those legal and historical traditions surrounding educational
organization that is state established, yet locally administered. In this setting legal and
educational structural issues must be considered that define the powers to operate,
control, and manage the schools (Alexander & Alexander, 1992). 
          In analyzing the American educational system and comparing it to central state
systems of education in foreign countries, one is struck by the diversity of authority
under which the American public schools are governed. As a federal and not a national
system, the government of the United States comprises a union of states united under
one central government. The particular form of American federalism creates a unique
educational system, which is governed by laws of fifty states with component parts
amounting to several thousand local school district operating units. Through all of this
organizational multiformity, and indeed complexity, runs a legal basis on which the
entire system is founded, those generally prescribed by our constitutional system. 
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          The critical position of education in a democratic society is self-evident. Over the
years the courts have come to conclude that society is best served by an educational
system that teaches "through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth out of multitude of tongues. Thus because of the importance of the
schools and because this robust exchange of ideas is vital to the educational process, the
perpetuation of that exchange is, at all levels of the educational system, a special concern
of the First Amendment" (Alexander & Alexander, 1992, p.229). No school can function
appropriately as a place for the exchange of ideas unless both students and faculty enjoy
an atmosphere conducive to debate and scholarly inquiry. 
          With this in mind, the reform of public education which includes the improvement
of educational programs for those children who are least well off, should remain open to
alternative views and divergent conceptions of evaluation. Critical evaluation can begin
to provide an accurate analysis of the production of inequality or the reproduction of
social injustice in the public schools. The ideology of critical evaluation can begin to
influence a movement toward the realization of an egalitarian ideal and the elimination
of inequality. I have asked educators and evaluators of education reform efforts to
reconsider critically their roles in social science research, to reclaim the battleground of
public school reform by focusing on the democratic purpose of public schooling, and the
institutional problems in educational programs and practice that often inhibit action
toward this ideal.
Conclusion
          Irrespective of the many social, economic, technological, cultural, and political
problems that face our American communities, the public schools exist for the purpose
of educating all children. Teachers are a part of the never-ending struggle to create
conditions in which learning takes place and provide the best educational opportunities
in a given situation. As evaluators rendering judgement on educational programs, and
giving merit or not giving merit to the educational repertoires and learning outcomes of
teachers; we also become inextricably linked to the process of either perpetuating an
already neutral disconnected reality of education or critically examining and observing a
wide range of crucial issues, structures, and problems in contemporary education. As
evaluators of education programs and teaching, we cannot ignore that we become a part
of the never-ending struggle to make judgment calls about a social activity which creates
the conditions or obstacles for social mobility. 
          The central task of the current reform movement in education is nothing less than
building and transforming schools that are struggling to achieve democratic ideals (Fine,
1994). While schools can be described as potentially a site of extraordinary democracy,
the processes and outcomes of schools deeply reproduce and promote the very social
inequities they are said to equalize (Fine, 1983). This circumstance imposes onto the
roles of educational leaders and critical evaluators a social responsibility, one that
demands sincere conscience and deliberate action. Evaluators and researchers, who in
the past have been content to describe dispassionately what schools are doing and how
they are functioning, are actually involved in and committed to a collaborative view of
knowledge creation. These characters in social change should not struggle to find a voice
that sensitively captures both the insider's and outsider's view of reality. When
characters, such as evaluators of educational reform, gain the conscience and
purposefulness of their critical role, no relationship is left untouched or unchanged.
In conclusion, evaluation is a powerful social force that has evolved only
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recently in advanced capitalistic societies, a new institution that promises to
be a major influence over the long term. Its influence can be both good and
bad. In either case, society before formal evaluation is not the same as
society afterward. Exactly what shape the practice, institution, profession,
and discipline will take in the future is impossible to predict. What is clear
is that its fate will be bound to the government and the economic structure
and determined in part by its own history and traditions. Some of its destiny
lies within the control of the evaluators themselves; some does not (House,
1993, p.172).
Note. Paper presented at the National Evaluation Conference, Youngstown State
University, Youngstown, Ohio, September, 1998
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